Does Corporate Governance Affect the Capital Structure Decisions of Omani Listed Companies? by Sariman, Ahmed Sultan Salmen
DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
DECISIONS OF OMAN1 LISTED COMPANIES? 
BY 
AHMED SULTAN SALMEN BIN SAlUMAN 
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA 
201 1 
DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
DECISIONS OF OMANI LISTED COMPANIES? 
A thesis submitted to the College of Business of Universiti Utara Malaysia 
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree 
Of 
Master of Science (International Accounting) 
BY 
Ahmed Sultan Salmen Bin Sariman 
Copyright O 201 1 by 
Ahmed Sultan Salmen Bin Sariman 
All Rights Reserved. 
DECLARATION 
I certify that the substance of this thesis has not been submitted for any degree and is not 
currently being submitted for any other qualification. 
I certify that any assistance received in preparing this thesis and all sources used have 
been acknowledged in this thesis. 
Ahmed Sultan Salmen Bin Sariman 
800023 
College of Business 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
060 10 
Ked ah 
February, 20 1 1 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this dissertation in partial hlfillment of the requirements for a postgraduate 
degree h m  Universiti Utara Malaysia, I hereby agree that the university library may 
make it freely available for inspection. I firther agree permission for copying of this 
dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by 
my supervisor or, in his absence, by the Dean of College of Business. It is understood 
that any copying or publications or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain 
shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due 
recognition shall be given to me and to Universiti Utara Malaysia for any scholarly use 
which may be made of any material from my dissertation. 
Request for permission to copy or to make use of material in this dissertation, in whole or 
in part, should be addressed to: 
Dean of College of Business 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 
Kedah Darul Aman 
Malaysia 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the relationship between corporate govemance and capital structure 
of listed firms in an emerging equity market, Oman. The study looked at 87 non- 
financial listed companies on the Muscat Securities Market and was examined by using 
multivariate regression analysis. Measurements of corporate govemance employed are 
bankers on board, board ownership, and interlocking directorates. The impact of 
controlled variables like firm size, profitability and age on firms' financing mechanism 
were also investigated. The results revealed that interlocking directorates was 
significantly and positively correlated with debt to equity ratio. However, corporations' 
financing behavior was not found to be significantly influenced by board ownership. The 
results revealed that a banker on board was significantly and negatively correlated with 
ratio of debt to equity, suggesting the firms in Oman were usually large family-owned 
business groups with concentrated ownership. The board of directors (banker-directors) 
may serve the purpose of family controlling shareholders. Furthermore, banker-directors 
were influenced by the Arabic traditional values and norms (e.g., personal relations, 
preference for individuals from influential tribes, etc.) which might affect their 
orientations and behavior. However, control variables, firm profitability was found to 
have a significant and negatively associated with the capital structure. Firm size and firm 
age were not found to be significantly associated with the capital structure. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
1.0 Introduction 
According to Omet and Mashharawe (2002), debt financing ratio in Oman (0.463) is 
considered higher than the other countries in the same region such as Jordan (0.377), 
Kuwait (0.327) and Saudi Arabia (0.261). However, comparing this ratio to the other 
developed countries such as the United States of America (0.58), Japan (0.69), Germany 
(0.73) and the United Kingdom (0.54), the percentage is lower. (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). 
This circumstance raises some significant questions since it has been empirically proven 
that there is an association between the ratio of debt financing and the existence of 
bankers on the board of directors (Guner et al., 2005; Dittmann et a]., 2009; De Matos et 
a]., 2009; Mitchell & Walker 2010). Therefore, this study tries to empirically and 
theoretically provide evidence on whether this association exists in Oman. 
Generally, capital structure is the way a corporation finances its assets through some 
combination of equity, debt, or hybrid securities. In other words, the capital structure 
is how a firm finances its overall operations and growth using different sources of finds. 
Currently, the issue of capital structure is one of the important issues that has attracted the 
attention of many researchers (see for example, Hasan & Butt, 2009; Saad, 2010; Huang 
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